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I. INTRODUCTION
The international literature on the economic circumstances of the elderly conventionally classifies the elderly as an income-poor but asset-rich group (Hancock, 1998b; Hurd, 1990; Rowlingson, 2006) . In Australia, while the elderly are typically clustered at the bottom end of the income distribution, the majority are homeowners who have paid off all or most of their mortgage. For most elderly homeowners, housing equity represents their most significant asset. Although two-thirds (three-quarters) of elderly Australian couples (singles) rely on social security payments as their principal income source, 85 percent (74 percent) own their homes outright, that is, they have paid off their entire mortgage (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007) . In a period of rapid population ageing that is driving up government expenditure on social security benefits and health care, fiscal sustainability and the balance of burden-sharing between generations have naturally come to the fore as issues of vital policy concern in industrialised countries. In this context, the housing wealth of elderly homeowners has emerged as a key asset that can be exploited to mitigate their low income levels through reverse mortgages. This has spawned the development of reverse mortgage markets in countries such the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Australia (Creighton, Jin, Piggott and Valdez, 2005) .
Reverse mortgages are designed to enable elderly homeowners to unlock illiquid wealth tied up in their housing equity to generate income. The elderly borrow against the value of their homes.
However, unlike a traditional forward mortgage, no repayments are made until the house is sold or the elderly borrower dies. The income generated from reverse mortgages clearly enables elderly homeowners on social security payments to become less reliant on government programmes to sustain their economic well-being.
The largest reverse mortgage market is currently in the US. Between 2001 and 2004 , the number of reverse mortgages originated annually increased by over 500 percent to 40,000 in the US. Reverse mortgages in countries like the Australia, Canada and the UK are smaller in comparison (Creighton et al, 2005) . However, signs of growth have been evident recently in the Australian market. Only three financial institutions were offering reverse mortgages at the start of 2005. By the end of 2006, this had increased to 18 (Wasiliev, 2006a) . In 2005, the amount lent through reverse mortgages was $650 million (Munro, 2006) . At the end of 2006, reverse mortgages were worth $1 billion in total and are forecasted to grow by at least $500 million annually (Wasiliev, 2006b ).
Despite signs of growth in the market, there has been a dearth of quantitative research on the impacts of reverse mortgages on elderly Australian homeowners. Among the few existing Australian studies, Reed and Gibler (2003) and Thosar (2002) discuss the effectiveness of reverse mortgages in the context of population ageing. The possible impediments to reverse mortgage that Australian elderly homeowners face are discussed in Beal (2001) . However, thus far studies have been descriptive in nature and have not ventured into the use of quantitative approaches to conduct analysis. This paper contributes to the existing knowledge base by adopting a quantitative approach to investigate the extent to which reverse mortgages can improve the economic well-being of elderly Australians and identify those groups who are most likely to benefit from entering into a reverse mortgage, as well as those who are unlikely to reap much benefit. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the existing international literature on reverse mortgages. Section 3 outlines the modelling methodology. The empirical findings are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
II. EXISTING LITERATURE
Existing reverse mortgage studies have produced somewhat mixed conclusions about the extent to which reverse mortgages can improve economic well-being. Using the Survey of Income and Programme Participation, Mayer and Simons (1994a; 1994b) find that one-third of elderly homeowners would increase their income by more than 20 percent with reverse mortgages in the US. While Mayer and Simons (1994a; 1994b) present somewhat favourable findings, Venti and Wise (1991) find that the median elderly homeowner only benefits from a small percentage increase in income from reverse mortgages despite using the same dataset as Mayer and Simons. Using the American Housing Survey, Merrill, Finkel and Kutty (1994) also present findings of modest impacts, identifying only 800,000 out of 12 million households as being the prime target group to benefit from reverse mortgages. In the UK, Hancock (1998a) finds that the potential gains in net income from reverse mortgages are small for elderly homeowners.
Studies that have examined the impacts of reverse mortgages on poverty alleviation have also arrived at conflicting findings. In the UK, Hancock (1998a; 1998b) finds that reverse mortgages has little potential to reduce poverty substantially among elderly homeowners. Hancock (1998a) finds that with reverse mortgage, the proportion of elderly homeowners with incomes below the household mean level would fall marginally from 67 to 64 percent after entering into a reverse mortgage. However, in the US, Kutty (1998) finds that 29 percent of all income-poor elderly homeowner households would be raised above the poverty line with reverse mortgages, and Mayer and Simons (1994a) finds that reverse mortgages would cause the poverty rate to drop from 16 percent to 4 percent among reverse mortgage eligible homeowner. When viewed in terms of the income-poor, these estimates indicate that three-quarters of the income-poor would be lifted out of poverty. The differences in findings between the UK and US can partly be attributable to the fact that reverse mortgage income is subject to taxation and can reduce social security entitlements in the UK, but is tax-free and generally does not affect social security entitlements in the US (Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2007; HECM, 2005) .
While findings on the extent to which reverse mortgages can improve economic well-being have been somewhat ambivalent, studies generally agree that the benefits of reverse mortgages are largely restricted to very elderly single homeowners (Hancock, 1998a; Kutty, 1998; Kutty, 1999; Venti and Wise, 1991) . Merrill et al (1994a) note that it is those with significant housing equity who are most likely to benefit from reverse mortgages. Studies have also found that women are more likely to benefit than males (Hancock, 1998a; Kutty, 1998; Kutty, 1999) . For example, Kutty (1998) finds that among elderly homeowners who can be lifted out of poverty by reverse mortgages, 69 percent are women. This paper is the first Australian contribution to the international literature on the effects of reverse mortgage on elderly groups. The modelling methodology of this paper is detailed in the next section.
III. MODELLING METHODOLOGY

The Reverse Mortgage Model
A reverse mortgage model is simulated, based largely on the features of the US Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) programme. The HECM programme is the main programme in the US reverse mortgage market and has expanded rapidly over the last decade. The volume of HECM loans in 1990 was 157. By 1999, the volume was 50 times higher at 7,982 loans. Between 1999 and 2006, the volume of HECM loans increased ten-fold to 76,351 (Foote, 2007) .
A HECM-type reverse mortgage has been chosen as the basis of this paper's analysis for two reasons. First, the features of a HECM-type reverse mortgage provide a useful template for analysis that will enable comparison with other existing reverse mortgage studies. For example, studies such as Case and Schnare (1994) , Kutty (1998) , Kutty (1999) and Morgan et al (1996) are also based on HECM-type reverse mortgages. Second, HECM-type reverse mortgages are typically multi-purpose government-backed programmes where the government protects homeowners (borrowers) from negative equity risk by ensuring that the borrower's liability will not exceed the value of the property at the end of the loan tenure. The elderly have been traditionally identified as risk-averse and financially conservative (Capozza and Megbolugbe, 1994) . Hence, the backing of the government will likely assist the development of a reverse mortgages market among the elderly. Beal (2001) has noted that development of a reverse mortgage market among the elderly has not been smooth where the government has not facilitated its development, as in case of the UK.
Following Kutty (1998) , Mayer and Simons (1994a) , Merrill et al (1994) and Rodda, Herbert and Lam (2000) , this study assumes a tenure plan in which monthly payments are made to the borrower in the form of an annuity. There is no algebraic formula for calculating payments for borrowers under the line-of-credit and hybrid plans, since borrowers can make drawings whenever they want to in the amount of their choice (Rodda et al, 2000) . However, monthly payments under the tenure payment plan can be determined algebraically. A sinking fund formula derived from HUD's HECM handbook (1994) and Rodda et al (2000) is used to calculate the monthly payments elderly homeowners would receive if they enter into a reverse mortgage programme 2 : The monthly compounding rate, r, is one-twelfth of the sum of an expected average mortgage interest rate and a mortgage insurance premium. As with HECM-type reverse mortgages, the expected average interest is set as the sum of the June 2002 yield on ten-year Commonwealth treasury bonds of 5.86 percent and a lender's margin of 1 percent. The mortgage insurance premium is set at 0.5 percent. The mortgage insurance is designed to protect lenders from collateral risk, that is, the risk that the loan balance may exceed the value of the property by the end of the loan tenure.
As lenders generally have to provide borrowers with a no-negative equity guarantee such that the borrower's liability will not exceed the value of the property, borrowers have to pay a mortgage insurance premium to the government so that the loan can be assigned to the government should the loan balance exceed the value of the property (Rodda et al, 2000) 3 . The interest rate r is 7.36 percent, or one-twelfth of the sum of the yield on ten-year Commonwealth treasury bonds, the lender's margin and the mortgage insurance premium. The expected remaining life expectancy is calculated as 100 years minus the age of the borrower at the beginning of the loan (Rodda et al, 2003) 4 .
0 i L , represents the maximum loan advance available to the borrower. It is a function of the level of housing equity, the borrower's age and the interest rate. The higher the housing equity level or the borrower's age, or the lower the interest rate, the higher the maximum loan advance. As older borrowers have shorter remaining life expectancies, the maximum loan advance is higher as Under Australian laws, income from reverse mortgages generally does not affect tax liabilities and are not means-tested, that is, they do not reduce social security entitlements if they are paid as an income stream and are not used for investment purposes (Beal, 2001) . This is similar to laws in the US, where income from reverse mortgages spent within the month is generally tax-free and nonmeans-tested (HECM, 2005) .
Analytical Framework
The reverse mortgage model described above forms the basis of an integrated analysis which is designed to achieve the paper's aim of examining the impact of reverse mortgages on the economic well-being of the elderly and groups most likely to benefit from the programme. Potential economic gains from reverse mortgages are measured by computing net income and poverty rates before and after reverse mortgages. Net income measures are equivalised using equivalence scales from OECD equivalence scales that allocate 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for each additional adult and 0.5 for each dependent child 7 . The economic well-being measures are reported by housing equity level, age band, income unit type and region. The proportion of the income-poor who can be lifted out of poverty by entering into reverse mortgages is also calculated. All estimates are weighted by population weights to ensure that the survey estimates conform to benchmarks that are based on the numbers of persons and income units in the Australian elderly population.
Analysis is conducted to identify states and territories in which collateral risks may be undesirably high for homeowners. Collateral risk is defined as the risk that the loan balance may exceed the value of the property by the end of the loan tenure. If lenders have mortgage insurance, they are protected from collateral risk and this allows lenders to provide borrowers with a no-negative equity guarantee. However, a collateral risk analysis remains important for various reasons. First, elderly homeowners residing in areas with slow property growth rates risk being left with insufficient housing equity to draw on in times of need. For example, consider the case of an elderly homeowner with a reverse mortgage who is unable to continue independent living in his/her own property. If the elderly homeowner's loan balance has exceeded the value of the property at the time of moving out of the property into an aged care facility, s/he will be unable to meet accommodation charges in the facility. This also poses a risk for the government who may have to intervene with additional income support during the elderly's remaining years (Berry and Dalton, 2007) . Second, elderly homeowners in areas with slow property growth rates may have little housing equity to bequeath to their beneficiaries when they pass away. This may in turn result in increased housing affordability problems for future generations (Berry and Dalton, 2007) . Third, due to the current lack of regulation in the Australian reverse mortgage market, best practice in the market is only guided by a voluntary industry code, in which a proven breach of a no-negative equity guarantee by lenders is not enforced by law. A lender could potentially exploit relatively trivial contract breaches to deny a borrower the no-negative equity guarantee, e.g. when a borrower fails to carry out regular maintenance or home valuations at his/her own cost (Munro, 2006 
IV. FINDINGS
Estimates from A strong housing equity effect dominates, as shown by the steep increase in gains as housing equity increases. While homeowners in the lowest decile gain 22 percent in income, those in the highest decile enjoy more than a doubling of their income level, the increase being 142 percent. A positive age effect is also evident. As the age of the borrower increases, expected remaining life expectancy falls, reducing the period over which the loan advance is annuitised. Hence, the gains are higher for those in older age groups.
Estimates by income unit type indicate that reverse mortgages could particularly benefit single elderly women. These findings have particular significance because women have longer life expectancies than men and are therefore more likely to need to incur significant health care costs during old age. Among those aged 80 or over in the sample, two-thirds are made up of single women, while only one-fifth are single men. Elderly women also tend to have lower incomes than men and are therefore tend to be more reliant on social security payments to sustain their economic well-being. Table 1 shows that the mean net income of single females is only three-quarters the income of single males. Moreover, 82 percent of single females rely on social security payments as their principal income source, as compared to 70 percent of single males. Couples are least likely to benefit from reverse mortgages even though they ten to have higher housing equity. This is because it is the age of the younger partner that is used to calculate monthly annuities. Elderly singles tend to be older than the younger partner among elderly couples. Thus, the loan advance has to be annuitised over longer periods for elderly couples than elderly singles. This age effect appears to outweigh the housing equity effect, that is, even though couples have a higher mean housing equity than singles, they do not appear to benefit as much from reverse mortgages as singles do because of the longer period over which the loan is annuitised for couples. These findings are similar to findings from the US and UK, which conclude that reverse mortgages benefit very elderly single homeowners (Hancock, 1998a; Kutty, 1998; Kutty, 1999; Venti and Wise, 1991) , those with significant housing equity (Merrill et al, 1994) and elderly women (Hancock, 1998a; Kutty, 1998; Kutty, 1999 likely to gain from reverse mortgages. In New South Wales, where the mean housing equity is notably high at almost $400,000, the gain in net income from reverse mortgage is almost 100 percent. Only homeowners in South Australia and Tasmania, where mean housing equity is less than $200,000, experience less than 50 percent gain in net income from reverse mortgages.
TABLE 1 HERE
The focus now turns to examining the extent to which reverse mortgages can alleviate poverty among the elderly. Income-poor elderly homeowners are defined as those whose net incomes fall (Hancock, 1998a; 1998b) . A key reason contributing directly to this difference is that while reverse mortgage income is generally tax-free and does not affect social security entitlements in Australia, it is subject to taxation and is assessable for means-tested benefits in the
UK (Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2007).
The findings from Australia are more similar to findings from the US, which indicate that reverse mortgage has the potential to lift a significant percentage of the income-poor out of poverty. In the US, Mayer and Simon (1994a) find that three-quarters of the income-poor will be lifted out of poverty, and Kutty (1998) finds the percentage that can be lifted out of poverty to be 29 percent.
However, the gains from reverse mortgages reported in this paper still far exceed the gains reported in studies from the US despite similar tax and social security rules. One reason contributing to this difference is that the housing equity-to-gross income ratio is significantly higher in Australia than in the US. Disney, d'Ercole and Scherer (1998) reports that the level of wealth is almost 12 (15) times the income of singles (couples) aged 67 years or over in Australia; in the US, wealth is comparatively lower at 6 (7.5) times of income levels 10 . altering the tax and social security rules has no effect on collateral risk as it does not affect the amount of outstanding loan balance or the property value at the end of the loan tenure.
TABLE 3 HERE
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the extent to which reverse mortgages can improve the economic wellbeing of elderly Australian homeowners. The findings indicate that the scope for reverse mortgages to improve economic well-being and alleviate poverty is considerable in Australia. Elderly homeowners can receive a net gain in income of 71 percent from reverse mortgages, and as many as 95 percent of income-poor elderly homeowners who are eligible for reverse mortgage can be lifted out of poverty. Elderly homeowners who are likely to receive the largest gains are very elderly, single and female homeowners with significant housing equity. These gains are significant and are possible because elderly Australian homeowners have high levels of housing equity and income from reverse mortgage is non-taxable and non-means-tested in Australia. Policy simulation findings indicate that taxing and means-testing income from reverse mortgages would shrink the net reverse mortgage income gains of the elderly from 71 percent to 47 percent.
Homeowners who enter into a reverse mortgage in areas with slow house price appreciation rates like South Australia and Tasmania are likely to face high collateral risk. In Tasmania a potentially critical concern for homeowners is that the house price appreciation rate is so low that even a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the interest rate fails to reduce collateral risk at all for elderly homeowners in this state. Collateral risk can be reduced if the elderly were to convert only part, not all, of their maximum loan advance into income. If homeowners were to convert three-quarters of their loan advance into income instead of 100 percent, collateral risk would be almost halved in Tasmania and completely eliminated in all other states or territories. While a 75 percent conversion results in smaller net income gains, the percentage of income-poor lifted out of poverty would remain the same under a 75 percent and a 100 percent conversion. Aside from a part-conversion of housing equity into income, there are other similar products which could potentially reduce collateral risk for the elderly. For example, under a succession loan, the elderly borrow against the value of their homes, but their children pay the interest on the loan, leaving only the principal amounts to be repaid at the end of the tenure (Wasiliev, 2006a) . Empirical analysis of a succession loan is outside the scope of this paper. However, succession loans are currently available in Australia and are clearly an alternative worth considering especially if the elderly wish to have remaining housing equity at the end of the loan to bequeath to their children.
Overall the paper has argued that given the concentration of wealth in the form of housing equity among elderly Australians and the current tax and social security arrangements in Australia, reverse mortgages can potentially be of great benefit to the ageing population. However, it is also clear that an elderly homeowner who enters into a reverse mortgage can potentially be exposed to great financial risks in the current highly unregulated Australian reverse mortgage market. In Australia, the lack of regulation in the reverse mortgage market means that best practice is only guided by a voluntary industry code developed by the Senior Australians Equity Release Association of Lenders, where a breach of the code is not enforced by law (Munro, 2006) . The removal of the nonegative equity guarantee through trivial contract breaches can expose the elderly to undesirably high collateral risks, especially in states where house price appreciation rates have been historically low. Certainly the experiences of countries such as the UK would suggest that the development of the reverse mortgage market in Australia will not be smooth unless there is appropriate government involvement in the form of active regulation and government-backed reverse mortgage products.
APPENDIX A1: PARAMETERS OF THE REVERSE MORTGAGE MODEL
The model parameters are set as closely as possible to parameters in papers that analyse HECMtype reverse mortgages. For examples of studies that detail programme parameters for HECM-type reverse mortgages, refer to Case and Schnare (1994) and Rodda et al (2000) .
The monthly interest rate is
where z = Expected average mortgage interest rate p = Mortgage insurance premium
The expected mortgage average mortgage interest rate, z, is set at 6.86 percent, that is, the yield on ten-year Commonwealth treasury bonds of 5.86 percent plus lender's margin of 1 percent. The mortgage insurance premium, p, is set at 0.5 percent. Hence, r is 7.36 percent.
The maximum loan advance is The loan advance factor, i F , is derived from the US's HECM Handbook (HUD, 1994 ) that depends on the borrower's age and interest rate r and applied to elderly homeowners in the 2002-03 SIH. In the handbook the factors are listed for interest rates ranging from 7 to 15.875 percent and the interest rates are listed in intervals of 0.125 percent. The interest rate that is closest to the required rate is chosen. In this analysis, the handbook interest rate that is closest to 7.36 percent is 7.375 percent. Because the 2002-03 SIH categorises the elderly into four age bands (65-69, 70-74, 75-79 and 80 or over), each person is assigned the weighted average age of his/her age band. The HECM loan factors by gender and age band are detailed in table A1. In the case of a couple, the age of the younger partner is used. The housing equity variable, i H , is the sale price of the property less debt secured against the property. Itemised costs, i C , paid at the start of the reverse mortgage loan include fees incurred for application, loan origination, title deed search, home inspections, and an upfront mortgage insurance premium. Fees are set at 2 percent of housing equity and the upfront mortgage insurance premium is set at 2 percent of housing equity.
TABLE A1 HERE
APPENDIX A2: EXPONENTIAL PROPERTY GROWTH MODEL
An exponential growth model is employed to estimate the house price appreciate rate in each capital city and to project the HPI borrowers are likely to face at the end of their tenure using HPI data from June 1986 to June 2005. The predicted growth rates are used to forecast the property values of the elderly at the end of the loan tenure. This forecasted value is compared with the loan advance at the end of the tenure to distinguish between regions most likely to benefit from reverse mortgages and regions in which collateral risk would be undesirably high for homeowners.
The exponential property growth curve, expressed in log-linear form, is
Regression statistics are reported in Table A3 . The coefficient a represents the quarterly nominal house price appreciation rate, so the annual house price appreciation rate can be approximated by 1 The author wishes to thank Gavin Wood and two anonymous referees for constructive comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author. 2 A sinking fund is a fund into which the annuities are paid into and invested to sum up to a given amount by a particular date in the future (Merrett and Sykes, 1973) . HUD (1994) and Rodda et al (2000) explains the calculation of payments under a tenure plan in detail.
3 If the lender chooses to receive a portion of the mortgage insurance premium, the lender may not assign the loan to the government (Rodda et al, 2000) . 4 While females typically have longer life expectancies than males, the HECM payment calculator assumes that borrowers will live until 100 years old (HUD, 1994) . 5 An income unit is different from a household because an income unit comprises one or more persons whose command over income is shared (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997). Income sharing is assumed to take place among couples, and between parents and dependants. A household comprises people who typically reside together, and can contain more than one income unit. In Australia, the income unit is the standard unit for analyses of economic wellbeing. It is often the preferred approach in Australian housing studies (Dalton and Ong, 2007; Wood, Watson and Flatau, 2006 10 While wealth comprises both housing equity and financial assets, housing equity accounts for the dominant share of wealth among the elderly in both countries (Disney et al, 1998) . 
